Better Regulation at Risk: Why the European Commission’s Latest Consultation Matters

The European Commission has opened a Call for Evidence on Better Regulation, closing on February 4, 2026. At first glance, this may appear to be a routine procedural consultation. In reality, it marks a potentially significant constitutional shift in how EU lawmaking is conducted.

What is at stake is nothing less than the future of participatory governance and evidence-based policymaking in the European Union.

From Exception to Norm?

The consultation signals the Commission’s intention to institutionalise the expedited procedures used for the 2025 omnibus packages. These packages departed from standard legislative safeguards, notably by curtailing public consultation and bypassing impact assessments.

The Commission justified these departures by invoking a “volatile geopolitical environment” and the need for “urgency.” Yet crucially, it did so without establishing clear, objective criteria for when such procedural shortcuts are constitutionally permissible.

Urgency can, of course, justify exceptional measures. But when exceptions are left undefined and unbounded, they risk becoming the rule.

This is precisely the concern raised by the European Ombudsman, who found maladministration in the preparation of the Omnibus I package, citing inadequate consultation and insufficient justification for urgency. Rather than responding to these findings by reinforcing procedural safeguards, the Commission now appears poised to normalise these accelerated practices.

If adopted, this approach would mark a shift away from the principles of Better Regulation that the EU has spent years developing: transparency, participation, accountability, and evidence-based decision-making.

Why This Matters

Public consultations and impact assessments are not bureaucratic formalities. They are constitutional safeguards. They:

• enable meaningful stakeholder participation,

• improve legislative quality through evidence and expertise, and

• provide democratic legitimacy to EU policymaking.

Systematically weakening these mechanisms risks concentrating power within the executive, reducing scrutiny, and diminishing trust in EU institutions—at precisely the moment when institutional credibility is most needed.

Moreover, invoking geopolitical volatility without articulating concrete thresholds or procedural limits creates a dangerous precedent. Nearly any policy area can be framed as urgent in today’s world. Without clear guardrails, “urgency” becomes a flexible justification rather than an exceptional condition.

A Constructive Path Forward

In response to this Call for Evidence, a scholarly submission is being prepared that takes a constructive approach. Rather than merely criticising current practice, it proposes concrete reforms, including:

• clearer criteria for when expedited procedures may be used,

• stronger requirements for documenting and justifying urgency,

• minimum consultation standards even in accelerated processes, and

• enhanced ex post review when impact assessments are bypassed.

The aim is not to paralyse decision-making in times of crisis, but to ensure that speed does not come at the expense of constitutional principles.

An Invitation to Engage

Colleagues across law, political science, and EU studies are invited to co-sign this submission to demonstrate broader academic concern about these developments. Collective endorsement strengthens its institutional impact and signals that Better Regulation is not a technical detail, but a core element of EU constitutional governance.

Those interested can review the full draft via the shared link and add their signature by February 3 (midnight) to allow time for final submission.

This is a moment for the academic community to engage directly with the evolution of EU lawmaking procedures. The choices made now will shape how “urgency” is defined—and constrained—for years to come.

If we care about participatory democracy and accountable governance in Europe, this consultation deserves our attention.