Publications

Do systematic approaches to economic policy appraisal, specifically regulatory impact assessment (RIA), enable complex organizations to learn? This question invites a reconsideration of how we conceptualize learning in public policy. Consequently, this paper distinguishes between economic-Bayesian learning, social learning, and political learning. These three types of learning are examined alongside the null hypothesis of change brought about by factors different from learning – such as partisan politics, regulatory competition, and coercion. Evidence from four countries (Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK) is examined within a time-period of ten years or so, controlling for both domestic and multi-level (that is, domestic-EU) effects. The findings corroborate social learning rather than economic-Bayesian learning. In turn, social learning does not provide a convincing explanation, unless one enters political learning. There is only random and scattered evidence for the null hypothesis, but this is contingent on a sample of highly developed countries, in which coercion from international organizations and donor requirements do not play a significant role.

Governments throughout the world are requiring greater use of economic analysis as a way of informing policy decisions. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the use of impact assessment in the European Union, using US assessments as a benchmark. We find that recent EU impact assessments include more economic information than they did in the past, although important items are still missing. We also provide evidence that the quality of EU impact assessment increases with the expected cost of a proposal. Furthermore, we find that the quality of EU assessments that report high total costs is similar to that of US assessments.

This chapter introduces one of the "better regulation" instruments, the Standard Cost Model (SCM), a method for measuring the administrative burdens imposed by regulation on businesses. The chapter examines the content and purposes of the SCM. It discusses some of the limits of the model and difficulties that public administrations may face in its application and provides recommendations for improving the model. It describes recent applications of the SCM, with a particular focus on the UK experience and the European Commission. It is argued that the introduction of such methodology in the Impact Assessment guidelines may have an effect on the EU "better regulation" agenda, namely shifting the regulatory pendulum to a more de-regulatory dimension.

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The better regulation agenda of the EU and the Member States has converged around plans for the reduction of administrative burdens. This is often presented as a pragmatic and efficient way to improve on the regulatory environment in Europe. However, there may be more symbolic politics than real efficiency gains in these plans, unless some conditions are met. This explains why business has not yet embraced wholeheartedly the ‘war on red tape’ agenda. The conclusion is that the agenda should be re-set in terms of regulatory quality, rather than focusing on ‘quantity targets’ in narrow areas of regulation.

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Policy-makers increasingly see impact assessment as the philosopher’s stone that will enhance the quality of EU legislation in the years to come, leading Europe back onto the Lisbon track. But does the EU’s impact assessment model actually possess the virtues ascribed to it? This new book by Andrea Renda offers a scorecard analysis of the first 70 Extended Impact Assessments performed by the European Commission, and concludes that the procedure has only produced a sea of disappointment. Renda’s analysis of international best practices reveals that impact assessment is far from being a panacea, especially when built on shaky methodological and organisational grounds. The book proposes ten roadmaps to improve the current model, aiming to contribute to the upcoming review of the EU’s impact assessment model, scheduled for early 2006.

This paper provides a critique of broad aggregate proposals to reduce the regulatory burden. It argues that the public debate about regulatory reform and red tape is loose and general, with little regard for the complex ways in which regulation imposes costs and benefits on the economy. Although there are theoretical reasons to expect regulation to be in excess supply, there is little empirical analysis to link aggregate regulation with productivity and economic growth. Regulation is itself a public good, and many aspects of economic efficiency require regulation to address market failures. The main efficiency issues are better addressed through a disaggregated approach, focusing on when, where, and how to regulate, rather than on crude aggregate estimates of the total burden. The design of regulation needs to take account of regulatory capture, and it is argued that market-based instruments and independent regulatory bodies tend to reduce the scope for capture. The incentives and employment rules governing regulatory institutions are also discussed. In ignoring these disaggregated regulatory design problems, crude aggregate targets for the reduction of regulation, and rules such as ‘one in, one out’ may be counter-productive.

In 2001, Martin Cutts redrafted Toy-Safety Directive 88/378/EEC in plain language. He criticized the language of that Directive as being archaic legalese. He added that Directives, as a whole, were poorly drafted. The European Commissions Legal Service rejected his criticisms. It stated that it had published the European Commission's plain language guidelines after Directive 88/378/EEC had been drafted. In a previous article in the Statute Law Review, Butt and Castle's plain language guidelines were explicated using examples from Directive 2002/2/EC. In this article, their guidelines are applied to the whole of that Directive to see if its language is 'clear, simple, and precise'. The criticisms made in the previous article, combined with those made in this article, suggest that the drafters of Directive 2002/2/EC have not yet mastered the skill of writing in 'clear, simple, and precise' language