Publications

The EU's new approach to policy evaluation is characterised by a focus on closing the policy cycle (linking ex ante and ex post appraisal) and by applying evaluation to all types of policy intervention, whether expenditure or regulatory policy. This article analyses the main features and challenges of this new approach. It first studies the conceptual and interdisciplinary challenge of such an encompassing approach to evaluation. It then assesses the new approach in the light of four key objectives of ex ante and ex post appraisal; ensuring evidence and learning; accountability, transparency and participation; policy coherence; and reducing the regulatory burden.

Evaluations may perform a key role in political systems as they provide a basis for parliaments to hold their executives accountable. This is equally the case in the European Union. Yet, several factors may work against the usage of European Union evaluations for accountability purposes. Members of the European Parliament work under great time pressure and executives may have little incentives to produce high-quality evaluations. This article therefore addresses the question of to what extent and when Members of the European Parliament use ex post legislative evaluations. We present an analysis of 220 evaluations, studying how many were referred to in parliamentary questions. Our main finding is that 16% of the evaluations are followed up through questions. However, the parliamentary questions hardly serve accountability aims. Members of the European Parliament mostly use evaluations for agenda-setting purposes. The main variable explaining differences in the usage of evaluations is the level of conflict between the European Parliament and Commission during the legislative process.

Governments are increasingly trying to limit the costs of regulatory compliance. One of the approaches that has been gaining ground in the last five years is the “one-in, x-out rule”, or the offsetting of regulatory costs stemming from new regulations by reducing the existing regulatory stock. This paper presents examples of regulatory offsetting approaches in selected OECD countries. By comparing the different approaches and discussing their key features, the paper provides guidance to countries considering introducing regulatory offsetting. This paper finds that there are many methodological and implementation issues that need to be resolved before a government decides to use a one-in, x-out approach as part of its regulatory policy. Key suggestions for countries introducing regulatory offsetting include i) ensuring a solid methodology for calculating regulatory costs; ii) linking the responsibility for finding offsets to the “owners” of regulation; iii) setting up quality oversight mechanisms; iv) securing strong political commitment and support and v) implementing regulatory offsetting as a complement to other regulatory management tools

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About ex-post review of legislation and better regulation I. The ex-post review of legislation is a key part of the Commission’s Better Regulation policy. It is aimed at facilitating the achievement of public policy objectives at minimum cost and improving the added value of EU interventions. In 2015, the Commission strengthened its better regulation policy by launching the Better Regulation Agenda. How we conducted our audit II. In our audit, we assessed whether the EU system of ex-post review of legislation had been properly planned, implemented, managed and quality-controlled, thereby contributing effectively to the Better Regulation cycle. III. The audit covered ex-post reviews of legislation carried out between 2013 and 2016 by four directorates-general of the Commission as well as all legislation and ex-ante impact assessments within the remit of those directorates-general adopted between 2014 and 2016. What we found IV. Overall, we concluded that the Commission’s current ex-post review system compares well to the situation in the majority of Member States. Regarding more specifically the evaluations, the Commission has designed a system which is, as a whole, well-managed and quality-controlled, thereby contributing effectively to the Better Regulation cycle. However, when it comes to reviews other than evaluations, we identified weaknesses. V. We found that review clauses and, to a lesser extent, monitoring clauses are widely used in EU legislation. However in the absence of common inter-institutional definitions and drafting guidelines, their content and therefore their expected outputs are not always clear. VI. While evaluations are generally carried out in line with legal requirements and good practices, this is less the case for the other reviews, to which the Better Regulation guidelines did not apply until 2017. We also identified shortcomings in the presentation of the methodology used and in the recognition of data limitations when applicable. 7 VII. We also found that ex-post reviews are publicly available and accessible and that the vast majority of them provide a clear conclusion and indicate next steps to be taken. The Commission systematically forwarded its reports on the ex-post reviews to the co-legislators (European Parliament and Council); the latter, however, seldom react to the Commission directly. Also, the ex-post reviews are not always used by the Commission when preparing ex-ante impact assessments. The inter-institutional agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on better law-making, which provides provision on the review of existing laws, is not binding. VIII. Finally, we found that the rationale of the REFIT programme is unclear, as are the criteria by which individual initiatives have been labelled as REFIT. At the same time, the guidelines present REFIT as a specific programme. This raises questions as to its current nature and added value. What we recommend IX. On the basis of these observations, we make several recommendations to the Commission and one to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board.

The Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB or ‘the Board’) was set up under the Commission’s 2015 better regulation policy. It scrutinises the quality of impact assessments, fitness checks and major evaluations for the Commission. The Board is a procedural safety mechanism governed by a mandate (1 ). It acts during the early stages of preparing legislation, and it helps to protect Europeans against poorly conceived laws. It also helps to find solutions for evaluations and impact assessments that are meant to inform policy decisions. It allows work that is in good shape to progress quickly with its stamp of approval, but is also able to halt the preparatory process. Any political decision to override the Board requires a public explanation why. Fast facts: • The Board is independent and reports to the President of the Commission. • There are seven full-time members, both from inside and outside the Commission. • The Board scrutinises all impact assessments, fitness checks and major evaluations. • All opinions are published.

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Last 12th June, the OECD launched a consultation on its “best practice principles” on regulatory impact assessment (RIA). The paper extends and elaborates the 2012 “Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance”, with the aim of providing member countries with a practical instrument to better design RIA systems. Although not particularly innovative in content, the “principles” outline some of the most recent trends in the international debate over RIA, such as a focus on governance issues and on the evaluation of non-economic impacts. (Siriana Salvi, Rassegna Osservatorio AIR, n. 4/2019)