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Better state regulation is a key component of economic reform. This is the first book to comprehensively explore international experience in the use of Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA), which involves assessing the potential benefits and costs of any regulatory change. The contributors reveal that RIA is being adopted by an increasing number of countries as a route to better regulation with varying degrees of success. The book includes contributions from leading experts on regulatory reform and introduces a range of case studies from developed, developing and transitional economies.

Impact Assessments (IAs) were introduced at the EU level under the rhetorical facade of ‘better regulation’. The actual aim was to improve not only the quality but also the reputation of EU regulation before stakeholders. However, evidence brought forward by a number of evaluations pointed out that IAs are yet to achieve acceptable quality standards. The paper offers an overview of different disciplinary approaches for looking at IAs. It suggests that risk regulation encompasses the theoretical foundations to help understand the role of IAs in the EU decision‐making process. The analysis of 60 early days preliminary IAs provides empirical evidence regarding policy alternatives, methodology of consultation and use of quantitative techniques. Findings suggest that dawn period IAs were used mainly to provide some empirical evidence for regulatory intervention in front of stakeholders. The paper concludes with assumptions about the future role of IAs at EU level.

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Do systematic approaches to economic policy appraisal, specifically regulatory impact assessment (RIA), enable complex organizations to learn? This question invites a reconsideration of how we conceptualize learning in public policy. Consequently, this paper distinguishes between economic-Bayesian learning, social learning, and political learning. These three types of learning are examined alongside the null hypothesis of change brought about by factors different from learning – such as partisan politics, regulatory competition, and coercion. Evidence from four countries (Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK) is examined within a time-period of ten years or so, controlling for both domestic and multi-level (that is, domestic-EU) effects. The findings corroborate social learning rather than economic-Bayesian learning. In turn, social learning does not provide a convincing explanation, unless one enters political learning. There is only random and scattered evidence for the null hypothesis, but this is contingent on a sample of highly developed countries, in which coercion from international organizations and donor requirements do not play a significant role.

Governments throughout the world are requiring greater use of economic analysis as a way of informing policy decisions. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the use of impact assessment in the European Union, using US assessments as a benchmark. We find that recent EU impact assessments include more economic information than they did in the past, although important items are still missing. We also provide evidence that the quality of EU impact assessment increases with the expected cost of a proposal. Furthermore, we find that the quality of EU assessments that report high total costs is similar to that of US assessments.

This chapter introduces one of the "better regulation" instruments, the Standard Cost Model (SCM), a method for measuring the administrative burdens imposed by regulation on businesses. The chapter examines the content and purposes of the SCM. It discusses some of the limits of the model and difficulties that public administrations may face in its application and provides recommendations for improving the model. It describes recent applications of the SCM, with a particular focus on the UK experience and the European Commission. It is argued that the introduction of such methodology in the Impact Assessment guidelines may have an effect on the EU "better regulation" agenda, namely shifting the regulatory pendulum to a more de-regulatory dimension.

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The better regulation agenda of the EU and the Member States has converged around plans for the reduction of administrative burdens. This is often presented as a pragmatic and efficient way to improve on the regulatory environment in Europe. However, there may be more symbolic politics than real efficiency gains in these plans, unless some conditions are met. This explains why business has not yet embraced wholeheartedly the ‘war on red tape’ agenda. The conclusion is that the agenda should be re-set in terms of regulatory quality, rather than focusing on ‘quantity targets’ in narrow areas of regulation.

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