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Government is committed to conducting formal impact assessments of the need for and likely impact of new regulations. A National Audit Office report has found that scrutiny of proposed legislation is strengthening and that the standard is better than it was, but one fifth of assessments still did not include any quantified data to assess costs or benefits. The Better Regulation Executive (BRE) has introduced new guidance, templates and training to improve the quality of impact assessments and, as a result, impact assessments have clearer presentation of results, better planning for implementation, and more quantification of costs and benefits. But wide variation remains between the best and worst impact assessments. Where they are done well, the impact assessments include a clear statement of the policy problem, make good use of consultation and have clear recommendations. On the other hand, only 20 per cent of impact assessments presented the results of an evaluation of a range of regulatory options. Many impact assessments did not pay enough attention to compliance and enforcement issues. For example, only one third of assessments assessed the cost of enforcement for the preferred option. There have been improvements in the analysis of costs and benefits. In 2008, 67 per cent of impact assessments quantified costs and 60 per cent quantified benefits. Under the previous arrangements, the figures were 56 per cent for quantified costs and 40 per cent for quantified benefits. There is, however, still wide variation in the level of evidence provided and insufficient analysis in the weaker impact assessments.

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In their recently published book Nudge (2008) Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein (T&S) defend a position labelled as ‘libertarian paternalism’. Their thinking appeals to both the right and the left of the political spectrum, as evidenced by the bedfellows they keep on either side of the Atlantic. In the US, they have advised Barack Obama, while, in the UK, they were welcomed with open arms by the David Cameron's camp (Chakrabortty 2008). I will consider the following questions. What is Nudge? How is it different from social advertisement? Does Nudge induce genuine preference change? Does Nudge build moral character? Is there a moral difference between the use of Nudge as opposed to subliminal images to reach policy objectives? And what are the moral constraints on Nudge?

Every day we make decisions, and we don't always choose well. The authors of this book believe that the reason for this is that we are all susceptible to cognitive biases and blunders that make us prone to error. But they demonstrate how we can use our human fallability and the way we think to our advantage.

Regulatory reforms in Europe have focused on 'good regulation', 'better law-making', and most recently 'regulatory quality'. This article deals with the main instrument used by governments to achieve regulatory quality in the law-making process, that is, regulatory impact assessment (RIA). The article argues that quality means different things to different stakeholders. Thus the approach to quality cannot be monolithic. Different stakeholders bring different logics in the RIA policy process. Logics are shaped by context. Yet the notions of quality that circulate in policy-makers’ circles are essentially insensitive to context. The result is that policy-makers who have tried to import RIA in European contexts (especially continental contexts) have found it difficult to scratch below the surface of new public management rhetoric and implement successful programmes. The argument here is not the trivial one that ‘context matters’ in the diffusion of RIA, but that we need to understand how it matters in terms of dimensions and mechanisms. Hence the article breaks down ‘context’ into four dimensions, that is, institutions, territory, theories of the policy process, and legitimacy. The conclusions balance efficiency and legitimacy, and formulate policy recommendations.

The EU proposal on liberalisation of the energy markets has been widely debated in policy, stakeholder and academic circles both for its content and the potential consequences to the gas and electricity markets. However, little has been said about the empirical evidence produced by the European Commission to support this legislative package. Since the Impact Assessment system has been in place, there have been concerns regarding quality and adequateness, especially when quantifying costs, benefits and risks. This paper analyses how these crucial issues were factored into the Impact Assessment on the third legislative package. It investigates the interaction between the legislative proposals on energy liberalisation and its Impact Assessment.

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A methodology to measure administrative burdens, based on the Dutch Standard Cost Model (SCM), has been applied in a large number of European countries, coupled in most cases with the commitment to a reduction target. This paper compares the application of the method in different national context and discusses its weaknesses and strengths against more complete forms of evaluation of the adequacy of regulation. The paper also discusses some indication arisen during the measurement of administrative burdens through SCM in Italy. Our main conclusion is that the SCM is a potentially useful tool and could provide motivation for culture change in policymaking. Its major strength, which lies mainly in its pragmatic approach and the possibility of commitment on a quantitative target, may be at the same time a source of weakness and may deliver some misleading results. Also some basic concepts of the model need a more rigorous definition to be consistently applied in different countries.

Despite a long tradition of effectiveness in laboratory tests, normative messages have had mixed success in changing behavior in field contexts, with some studies showing boomerang effects. To test a theoretical account of this inconsistency, we conducted a field experiment in which normative messages were used to promote household energy conservation. As predicted, a descriptive normative message detailing average neighborhood usage produced either desirable energy savings or the undesirable boomerang effect, depending on whether households were already consuming at a low or high rate. Also as predicted, adding an injunctive message (conveying social approval or disapproval) eliminated the boomerang effect. The results offer an explanation for the mixed success of persuasive appeals based on social norms and suggest how such appeals should be properly crafted.